Shell Agreement 1995

April 12, 2021

In June 2014, Shell sold 9.5% of its 23.1% stake in Woodside Petroleum and indicated that woodside had agreed to buy back 9.5% of its shares at a later date. Shell became Woodside`s largest shareholder after the then federal treasurer, Peter Costello, blocked an attempted acquisition in 2001, and the group openly sold its stake in Woodside as part of its asset reduction target. At a general meeting on 1 August 2014, 72% of shareholders voted in favour of the takeover, just below the 75% required to obtain their approval. In a statement from Shell, “Royal Dutch Shell acknowledges the result of the negative vote by Woodside Petroleum Limited shareholders on the selective takeover proposal. Shell is considering its options in relation to its remaining 13.6%.” [131] 296 Finally, the Commission states that, although it must admit that it has not fully accepted this agreement in all its aspects, it has been in close contact with the other major producers for a long time and has given its general support to the various schemes, up to concrete proposals, Accordingly, the criteria set by the Court in Suiker United (cases attached 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 11, 11, 113 and 114/73 Suiker United/Commission [1975] ECR 1663, point 173) are more than met and must be met for this to be a concerted practice. 298 Aus Nr. Section 86, paragraphs 2 and 3, paragraphs 3, 87 and 88 of the decision concludes that, alternatively, the Commission characterized the elements of the infringement as “concerted practices” where these elements did not justify the conclusion that the parties had reached a prior agreement on a common plan for defining their market activities, but that they complied with collusive arrangements that facilitated the coordination of their commercial behaviour. given the complexity of the agreement, it was not established that some producers had expressed explicit agreement on an approach agreed upon by others, despite their general support for the scheme in question and having proceeded accordingly. Therefore, the decision concludes that continued cooperation and agreements between producers in the implementation of a comprehensive agreement may, to some extent, have the hallmarks of a concerted practice.

332 The applicant argues that the Commission has grossly exaggerated the applicant`s role in the infringement, to the extent that the Commission wrongly argues that Shell, because it is one of the `big four`, is at the heart of the agreements in question, that each of them has, in turn, taken the lead in price initiatives and that Shell is therefore necessarily one of the `leaders` in the development and implementation of illegal agreements.


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